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Social Psychology and the Sociology 
of Knowledge 
(Psicologia Social y Sociologia del conocimiento) 
THOMAS SAMUEL EBERLE 
Hochschule St. Gallen, Switzerland 
One of the most promising perspectives to link social psychology wiht 
sociology has been, undoubtedly, the sociology of knowledge as formulated by 
Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality. The current twazty- 
., jifth anniversary of this book invites us to reassess its contents, to evaluate the 
im~ac t  it has exerted. and to examine its lenacv. 
" 2 
I t  was one of Alfred Schutz' major unrealized projects, prevented by his early 
death, to formulate a new theoretical foundation for the sociology of knowledge. 
His blend of phenomenology and Weberian sociology promised to locate the 
sociology of knowledge on new ground, redefining its perspective as well as its 
basic concepts. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, who had studied at 
the New School for Social Research in New York where Schutz had taught, 
decided to pursue this project when they met as junior members of the Graduate 
A ,  
Faculty at their <{alms mater>>. The result was quite dramatic: a modern 
sociological <{classic)> was born. 
In  social science, The Social Construction o f  Reality by Berm and Luckmann 
. -  
has become one of the most cited books of the past 25 years. Its title is, un- 
doubtedly, one of their outstanding achievements. Its contents, however, while 
brilliantly written have possibly never been really understood by many of its 
readers. Some have said. rather maliciouslv, that the book sold so well because 
, , 
many engineers (mistakenly) bought it. Unfortunately, I may add, of the many 
social scientists who bought or cited the book only a few have studied it. 
1. THE BASIC CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
The logic of the Social Construction was simple: Society must be grasped 
in its duality as an <<objective>> and a <rsubjective>> reality. The objective social 
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reality, although produced by social action, appears to the individual as separate 
and independent from him or her. The subjective side consists in the con- 
sciousness an actor has, shaped in pervasive processes of socialization, and sus- 
tained and modified in daily interactions. In this duality the seeming dichotomy ' 
of Durkheim and Weber was reconciled, and the basic question for sociological 
theory could beput as follows: <(How is it possible that subjective meanings 
become objective facticitiesw (Berger & Luckmann, 1967,30)? To avoid intricate 
philosophical reflections, they defined the key terms from the point of view 
of the natural attitude: <(It will be enough, for our purposes, to define "realityn 
as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being 
independent of our volition (we cannot "wish them away"), and to define 
"knowledge" as the certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess 
specific characteristics)> (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, 13). The ueuolutionary idea 
was to declare common sense knowledge as a central focus for the sociology of 
knowledge. Traditionally, the sociology of knowledge has been preoccupied with 
the history of ideas only; now, it must concern itself <(with everything that passes 
for "knowledge" in society), (ibid., 26). 
The authors' main thesis that reality is socially constructed, and that 
sociology has to study the ways in which this is done, was striking. The book 
resurrected Alfred Schutz' phenomenological analysis of the life-world, used 
it to clarify basic sociological concepts like role and institution, and offered 
a new synthesis not only of Weber and Durkheim, but also of Mead and 
philosophical anthropology (Gehlen and Plessner). Berger and Luckmann's ex- 
plication of the media through wich social order is objectified -typification, 
signs, symbols, habitualization, and so on- rendered deep insights into the 
richness of human interaction. Their analysis of the relationship between social 
institutions and the symbolic worlds of meaning (Sinnwelten) which legitimize 
them proved how conventional jargon about the <(logic of institutions)> obscured 
the actual processes through which institutions become social realities. They 
presented a sociological theory which conceived of social actors as competent 
humans, evaded sociological reifications, and abjured the widespread arrogance 
of social scientists (who at the time loved to talk of <(false consciousness~> and 
Freudian <cunconscious constraints)>, properly identified, of course, only by 
themselves). But above all they made clear how naive an objectivist stance towards 
social reality is. Put simply: The how of social phenomena has to be explicated 
before we can attend to the what and the why. 
2. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND IDEOLOGY 
The book was received well by its critics. Indeed, at a time when the 
prevalence of Parsonian structural-functionalism was eroding and the <(coming 
crisis of Western sociology>> (Gouldner, 1970) was being discussed, Social Con- 
struction gave new orientation to many sociologists. It offered a new reading 
of several sociological classics -different from Parsons' interpretation in his 
Stnlctuue of Social Action (Parsons, 1937)- and linked their perspectives in a 
fresh way. As Charles Lemert (1992, 10) puts it in retrospect: <To this day, I 
cannot think of a single book that presents with such exquisite parsimony so 
many different ideas so welb. 
Although Berger as well as Luckmann agree that they would change very 
little in the book if they were to rewrite it today (Berger 1992, l), its impact 
1 on American sociology remained -in the authors' view- somewhat marginal. 
One reason was that both authors were situated <(in an emphatically peripheral, 
non-elite institution)> ((ibid.). The other was {(the orgy of ideology and utopianism 
that erupted all over the academic scene in the late 1960's, almost immediately 1 after the publication of our book. Neither Luckmann nor I had any sympathy with this Zeitgeist...)> (ibid.). But it was this context, as I shall point out, which 
1 
shaped a specific -and mislead- reception of their book. 
In this respect, the situation in Europe was quite similar. Social Constuuc- 
tion was translated in many languages. In Germany, for example, it was publish- 
ed at S. Fischer in 1970, opening the new series ctconditio Humans)>, and was 
introduced by the great Helmuth Plessner. Interestingly enough, it was not 
reviewed by the renowned f i lner  Zeitschrij? fiiu Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. 
Otherwise it was well received. Book reviewers commended the new, un- 
ideological approach, praised the comparatively low price of a high-quality book 
and expressed amazement that an American original was published in German 
within only three (actually four) years1. Although the sociology of knowledge 
used to be a pet theme of German readers (as Plessner notes in the introduc- 
tion), Social Construction did not have an easy time of it. When structural func- 
tionalism and quantitative sociology -both imported from the United States 
after World War 11- confronted growing criticism in the sixties, it was the 
Frankfurt school as well as neo-Marxism which reaped the benefit. Then, after 
Habermas entered into a well-publicized debate with Niklas Luhmann (who 
defended a functionalist systems theory blending Parsonian and phenomenolo- 
gical concepts), the two became the most cited and quoted German sociologists 
of the period. 
In this intellectual context, in the United States as well as in Europe, Social 
Construction was often interpreted with a special twist. Many left-liberal veterans 
of the '60s turned to this book to make sense of life and sociology, detecting 
the arbitrariness of social constructions (cf. Lemert, 1992, 10). <(Constructionism)> 
became a radical perspective which helped to reveal reality, to strip it of 
ideological distortions, and to pave the way for new interpretations. Academic 
feminism is a particularly prominent example for this view. As inspiring as such 
an interpretation can be, it is far indeed from Berger and Luckmann's inten- 
tions. Thus Luckmann assures: <(whenever someone mentions "constructivism" 
or even "social constructionism': I run for cover these days>> (Luckmann, 1992, 
4). And Berger sees much of the <(constructivist)> literature as coming from the 
aforementioned <(ideological cauldron with which I have no affinity whatever)> 
(Berger, 1992, 2). 
Instead, Berger and Luckmann advocated an empivicalsociology of knowledge 
which investigates the intricate ways in which reality is socially constructed. 
I They adhered to the Weberian maxim that a scientist's task is to describe and 
explain social actions and their consequences as they are, but not to proclaim 
any political stance how things should be. In practice, this maxim of Weu- 
turteilsfeiheit has to be seen in its own complexities: Any empirical description 
or proposition makes use of typifications which are embedded in systems of 
relevancies, i.e. necessarily has its value implications. Thus, to see existing social 
constructions on different premises may well sharpen one's eyes for how they 
are construted, as both Schutz and Simmel have shown thoroughly with their 
1 analyses of being a stranger2. The main problem is not the search for ar- 
bitrariness in social constructions, but the way such research is done. I would 
agree here with Mary F. Rogers who brands <(theoretical tokenism), which un- 
duly limits the impact of Berger and Luckmann's book: <<Social Construcfionism 
often serves as little more than theoretical shibboleth accompanied by a few 
flat propositions about how people 'construct' their identities, worldviews, and 
taken-for-granted ways of managing their affairs)> (1992, 6). 
3. PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY 
O n  the other hand, even many of those who called themselves 
c~henonzenological sociologists)> did not grasp the logic of Berger and Luckmann's 
paradigm correctly. Many overlooked the central fact that the authors introduc- 
ed their dualistic conception of the society as an objective and a subjective reality 
by a part they explicitly called <(philosophical prolegomena>> and as such <{pre- 
socialogical~>: the phenomenological analysis of the foundations of knowledge in 
everyday life. They draw a strict line between a phenomenological analysis of 
the life-world and a sociological analysis of society: Both are <(empirical)>, 
although not in the same sense; while the phenomenological method is 
<<egological>>, the social scientific method is ctcosmological~, (cf. Luckmann, 1973). 
In  this sense, much of what has been labelled as ccphen~menolo~ical sociology~~ 
had little to d o  with phenomenology and not much to do with sociology either! 
I t  is one of the shortcomings of Social Construction, in my view, that Berger 
and Luckmann excluded epistemological and methodological considerations. I 
admit that tactically this may have been a good move: I t  stressed their intention 
to proclaim an empirical sociology of knowledge (as a <{Wirklichkeitswissenschafb>) 
which clearly differed from the older tradition, and it opened the door to the 
many social scientists who dislike any philosophical binding. However, they also 
risked broad misunderstandings of fundamental concepts and also missed out 
on a fuller analytic empowerment through Schutz' life-world analyses. For many 
it remained obscure why sociology should care about consciousness and subjec- 
tive meanings, given their concern with social actions and social facts. Why 
should they not restrict their attention to external, observable behavior? Yet, 
it is Shutz' critical epistemological contribution to analyze in rich detail the 
act of interpretation (Veustehen) in everyday life as well as in the social sciences. 
The formal meaning structures of the (phenomenologicalIy analyzed) life-world 
provides, on an epistemological level, a frame in which the hertneneutic task of 
any sociological analysis, qualitative or quantitative, inevitably has to be pur- 
sued. How (socially derived) subjective knowledge involved in concrete human 
actions can be explicated by the sociologist is a methodological issue. Its im- 
plications, however, are always epistemological. 
Thus, it is highly illuminating to examine Social Construction in the context 
of the Structures of the Life-World (Shutz & Luckmann 1973, 1989) and of the 
respective authors' methodological writings (Luckmann 1973, for one; Berger 
& Kellner 1981). In  this light, it becomes clear that rather terse term ctconstruc- 
tion>> parallels <{constitution)>: Construction is a social process and has to be analyz- 
ed by sociology; the constitution of meaning is a subjective process which takes 
place in consciousness and has to be  analyzed by phenomenology. Moreover, 
for readers bothered by the rather loose definitions of some central concepts 
in Social Construction (like "knowledge", "reality", "objectification" and so on), 
fine-grained specifications of each term can be found in the Structures of the 
Life-World. Even for those skeptical of the potential of phenomenological analyses 
to evade the reflexive circle, few other books explicate human experience, 
knowledge and action, the different transcendencies and the complex inter- 
relatedness of subjective and intersubjective knowledge in richer detail. Unfor- 
tunately, more than twenty years passed between the first publication of Social 
Construction and the publication of the second volume of Structures of the Life- 
World. This may have been one reason that the intimate relationship between 
the two has been recognized by rather few. I n  the intervening years, as indicated 
above, the reception of these basic ideas had taken quite diverse and often 
divergent routes. 
4. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND SUBJECTIVE 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Interestingly enough, Berger and Luckmann considered the title The Social 
Construction of Realitv as self-evident: thev have never delivered a clear defini- 
tion of what they meant by it. Furthermore, readers of translated versions of 
the book may well find that what is called <(construction)> or <{constructed>> in 
their language is expressed differently in  the English original. But, all things 
considered. {{social construction)> obviously has different meanings. For one, the 
v 
term <cconstruction)> has a static as well as a dynamyc aspect. I n  its static aspect 
it  denotes a reality-as-it-is (appears), in  its dynamic aspect it  means the process 
of realitv-consti-uction. Then again. it makes a difference if we see a natural 
landscape with its mountains, rivers, meadows, cows, farmhouses and so on -a 
naturalreality shaped by our cultural knowledge- or if we gaze at a society which 
is produced, through and through, by human actions. To understand what is 
going on in society (e.g. in a social setting), the sociologist has to grasp the mean- 
ings the actors themselves employ and are embedded in. 
I t  is one of the main theses of Social Construction that cultural constructs 
are sociallv stabilized by institutional structures. Constructions are thus not the 
subjective business of singular individuals. They are socially derived and inter- 
subjectively shared and enacted. The social constructionism of Berger and 
Luckmann therefore stands in strong opposition to the subjetive constructivism 
that ~ e o ~ l e  lik  Paul Watzlawick and others3 defend. The subjective construc- 
. . 
tion of reality is always based on internalized cultural knowledge and -leaving 
aside deep pathological abberrations- coordinated with other human actors 
in interactions or collaboration. As Goffman poignantly puts it: <<It some cases 
only a slight embarrassment flits across the scene in mild concern for those who 
tried to define the situation wrongly)> (Goffman, 1974, 1). 
Subiective constructivism leaves out iust what Social Construction is all about: 
reality construction in interaction and conversation, by means of internalized 
social objectivations and typifications, stabilized by routines, institutionaliza- 
tions and legitimations, and so on. Viewed against this background, subjective 
constructivism is ahistorical, asocial and blind to institutions. I t  is noteworthy 
that phenomenologists and idherents of the methodological individualism (in 
Weber's sense) have time and again encountered harsh criticism of being <{too 
subjectivist),, especially in American Sociology; but in  fact, i t  is Berger and 
Luckmann -both phenomenologists as well as methodological individualists- 
who have always incisively rejected such flat subjectivism! 
5. THE LEGACY FOR SOCIOLOGY 
I t  was Berger and Luckmann's aim to <(move the sociology of knowledge 
from the periphery to the very centre of sociological theory>> (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967, 29). They have partly succeeded: They managed to alter the 
consciousness of many sociologists and helped to institutionalize the ctsociology 
of knowledge>> as an acknowledged specialty in the sociological establisment. 
More encouraging may have been the fact that members of diverse disciplines, 
such as social psychologists, anthropologists, geographers, historians, ethologists 
and theologists also showed (and still show) a strong interest in  Social Construc- 
tion. If we consider, for instance, that a discipline like cognitive anthropology 
moved from the linguistic analysis of terms to the investigation of idioms and 
is now slowly arriving at the notion of cultural knowledge and its complex rela- 
tion to action4, we can appreciate just how far ahead Berger and Luckmann 
were twenty-five years ago. 
In addition, Social Construction has undoubtedly played a crucial role in mak- 
ing the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz popular to sociologists. Nowadays, 
phenomenological concepts are found throughout different fields of sociology. 
The German grand theorists, Habermas and Luhmann, have incorporated 
phenomenological concepts as central elements. Presently, even rational choice 
theorists are attempting to integrate Schutz' work on <<choosing among projects 
of action)> to refine their approach5. And in the United States, the so-called 
ctneo-institutionalists have developed an analysis that claims to draw directly 
on Social Construction6. However, there is also a lively discussion under way 
about how adequate these theorists are in hadling both the pheaomenological 
framework and-the social constructionist perspective and its concepts7. 
Berger and Luckmann themselves stayed close to Schutz. Both agree that 
their collaboration ended only because of geographical reasons (Berger, 1992, 2; 
Luckmann, 1992, 4). They also chose, although remaining compatible in prin- 
ciple, to follow different roads of theoretical development. Berger has repeated- 
ly advocated to return to the <(big questions)> which are, in his understanding, 
of a  m macro sociological^ sort (Berger 1992, 2). His major intellectual focus after 
Social Construction became the problems of modernization and Third World 
Development. Since 1985 he has been Director of the Institute for the Study 
of Economic Culture at Boston University, working with an interdisciplinary 
group of social scientists. H e  still holds that the way Social Construction related 
<(events within institutional structures to movements within the consciousness 
of individuals)> is the best guide to deal with social issues: <(the very concept 
of "economic culture': denoting the interface between economic institutions 
and various elements of culture (ideas, religion, morality, lifestyles), lends itself 
beautifully to elaborations in terms of the sociology of knowledge)> (Berger, 
1992, 2). 
Luckmann, who has been at the University of Constance since 1970, was 
first engaged in editing Schutz' Structures of the Life-World. H e  then turned 
to what Berger would term a ctmicrosociological~~ analysis, namely a program 
for the investigation of concrete communicative processes: 
<;These conceptual links, called by some a "theory" of communicative genres, start 
from the assumption that for recurring communicative problems in social interac- 
tions, more or less obligatory patterns of the organization of the communicative pro- 
cess are constructed socially. The system of genres in use, as well as less obligatorily 
structured communication in social milieus and institutions, may be conceived as 
the communicative budget of a society. I am convinced that a description of con- 
tinuities and changes in communicative budgets is a prerequisite for the description 
and explanation of social stability and change. It provides the formal empirical basis 
for a study of the manifold historical permutations of the social construction of reality. 
The first studies guided by that theoretical program looked at communicative pro- 
cesses which reconstruct various kinds of pasts: alarm calls to the fire department, 
gossip, conversational transmissions of information and wisdom, religious conversion 
stories, recapitulations of television programs, etc. The next four-year study will focus 
on "moralizing" genres. The data will consist of public debates during the Gulf War, 
"pastoral" counselling on radio programs, anti-smoking campaings, local ecology ap- 
~ea l s ,  pro- and anti-abortion arguments in various ~ u b l i c  and semi-public context, 
and the like, (Luckmann 1992, 4f.). 
Luckmann has continued to influence quite a strong group of German 
sociologists. I n  analyzing what Berger and Luckmann (1967, 78) called the <(con- 
versational apparatus)> in which a common sense of reality is constructed as an 
ongoing accomplishment in face-to-face situations, they borrow widely from 
ethnomethodology, ethnography, conversation analysis, symbolic interactionism, 
cognitive anthropology, and other specialities. By investigating the processes 
of reality construction locally and in situ, they complement the general level 
of analysis in Social Construction and materialize what had been Berger and 
~ u c k m a n a s  goal from the outset: to found an empirical sociology of knowledge. 
6. THE LEGACY FOR PSYCHOLOGY 
There is a special legacy for psychology. The message of Social Construction 
- in this respect is stronger than the rather scattered remarks throughout the book 
may indicate. Berger and Luckmann advocate a sociologic psychology -a 
psychology that derives its fundamental perspectives from a sociological 
understanding of the conditio humana. Let us review the main arguments. 
If their analysis of the interrelatedness of subjective and social stocks of 
knowledge is right, it follows clearly that every type of psychology is based on 
a cosmology. The investigation of subjective reality always implies some sort 
of social definition of reality. This becomes particularly manifest in psycho- 
therapy: Both the criteria by which pathological symptoms are identified as well 
as the therapeutical procedures by which the pathologies shall be  cured, are 
socially defined. They are inevitably bound to a certain cultural world view of 
a given society. I n  a sociological perspective, therapies have common features 
with other procedures of legitimation and often serve a specific ideology. But 
also beyond pathology and therapy, psychological theories differ considerably 
from other types of theory: Because of the close nexus between internalization 
and identification they tend to exert, more than others, socializing effects and 
shape identities. I n  a dialectical sense, psychologies produce a reality, which 
in turn serves as the basis for their verification. Taking this argument to the 
hilt, we may conclude that psychoIogy must be critical, in the sense that it must 
permanently reflect its social implications. Although we recognize a certain 
parallel to Habermas' postulate to h e r m e n e ~ t i c a l l ~  reflect the socially defined 
background assumptions of social theory, there is a fundamental difference to 
the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt school: Psychological premises cannot serve 
as quasi-objective instance to criticize a given society but have to be  scrutinized 
themselves' for their cosmological implications. 
A second argument for a sociological psychology results directly from the 
main thesis that reality is a social construction. I t  is vital to link reality con- 
structions to their plausibility structures, to the interactive processes (often in 
institutionalized settings) in which they are produced and maintained. Psychology 
therefore always has to be socialpsychology: Subjective worlds cannot be detached 
from the social processes in which they are constructed, communicated and sus- 
tained; features and properties of individuals cannot be observed and conceiv- 
ed of without investigating the labelling processes by which they are attributed; 
and personal identities may not be separated from the social structure of a given 
society in which they are constituted. 
Crucial in all these respects is the concept of knowledge: It reflects the dialec- 
tic between identity and its biological substratum and thus links social psychology 
whith philosophical anthropology. I t  also complements G.H. Mead's dialectic 
between personal and social identity with the dialectic between subjective and 
social stocks of knowledge. I t  thereby links social psychology to sociology, and 
by pointing to its social distribution, to the different cultural milieus with their 
specific typifications and systems of relevancies, it builds the bridge to the 
macrosociological level. These <<links,> and <<bridges)> are not just superficial 
rhetoric but attempt to achieve a fundamental integration. Although the authors 
repeatedly speak of microsociology and macrosociology, the logic of Social Con- 
struction proves this distinction to be artificial: Berger's <{big)> questions refer 
to the structure of society as a whole as well as to people's daily experience; 
modernization, urbanization, globalization, pluralism and so on are phenomena 
people actually experience in their everyday lives. Social psychological research 
therefore inevitably deals with phenomena of modernity or postmodernity even 
if it restricts itself to the so-called <<micro)>-level. The methodological implica- 
tions are magnifold -e.g. concerning the status of its concepts- but cannot 
be discussed here any further. 
To design a sociology of knowledge which links social psychology with 
philosophical anthropology on the one side and sociology on the other, has been 
an eminent contribution of Berger and Luckmann. Up to that time, neither the 
American social psychology nor the sociology of knowledge (e.g. Robert Mer- 
ton) had recognized their relevance for each other. Even nowadays, Social Con- 
structiotz provides a theoretical framework which is much broader than most 
other social psychological theories. To transpose its programmatic outline of a 
social psychology into ambitious theory and empirical research still involves a 
lot of work for many years to come. 
Notes 
(1) Helmut Dahmer in Soziale Welt (1970/71), Wolf Lepenies in FAZ (1969) und F.U. Pappi 
in Sociologica Ruralis (1971) and many others. I thank Thomas Luckmann for giving me his whole 
set of collected reviews of the book, and for a very illuminating discussion. 
(2) Schutz (1964) and Simmel (1968 [19081). 
(3) Cf. Watzlawick 1976, 1984. 
(41 C.f.. e.g.. Holland & Ouinn (19871. 
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